Chapter 1: The Allure of Foucault and Wittgenstein

I find myself consistently drawn to the philosophies of Foucault and Wittgenstein—not merely for their theoretical contributions but for their embodiment of a philosophical way of life. They exemplify what it means to engage in self-examination within contemporary philosophy. My main focus, however, lies in their philosophical methods, specifically genealogy and grammar. Analyzing these two concepts side by side may provoke discomfort, not only because such comparisons are rare but also due to their inherent incompatibility. So, why do I persist in exploring how these methods might intersect? It’s a question that occupies my thoughts daily, yet I feel compelled to seek an answer.

I perceive a certain synergy between genealogy and grammar that could yield valuable insights for my niche within academic philosophy: the philosophy of psychology. While employing either method in this field is not entirely unheard of, it certainly presents a fresh perspective. A colleague of mine, an analytical philosophy professor, once remarked that it is 'naive' to pursue originality and curiosity in theoretical philosophy. Initially, I took this as earnest advice, but I later recognized the underlying cynicism in her words, especially when directed at PhD students engaged in their own 'naive' theoretical explorations. Regardless, I am determined to navigate both these unconventional avenues, even intertwining them.

In modern discourse, the philosophy of psychology often aligns with cognitive science and philosophy of mind, focusing on concepts like intentionality, mental representation, and the mind-body problem. This subfield has largely adhered to paradigms established by thinkers like Ned Block, who framed it as a subset of philosophy of mind with deep roots in cognitive science. Consequently, philosophical inquiries frequently revolve around scientifically promising frameworks like functionalism, while broader methodological concerns regarding paradigms like behaviorism or psychoanalysis remain largely unaddressed. In essence, the philosophy of psychology is more closely linked to philosophy of mind than one might assume.

My aspiration to integrate genealogy and grammar into the philosophy of psychology stems from a desire to liberate my own thinking—and hopefully others'—from these entrenched, psychologized frameworks. By 'liberation,' I refer to both a release from subtle forms of subjectivation and a clarification of confusion. The more I explore this topic, the more I am astonished by how we can be 'captive' to a particular worldview shaped by both linguistic complexities and social hierarchies. Yet, I often grapple with self-doubt, questioning the validity of my stance against esteemed figures in the philosophy of psychology, who are undoubtedly respected thinkers. Who am I, a novice, to challenge their views? My thoughts are still tentative, lacking the robust arguments needed to solidify my opinions. Nevertheless, I will continue to persevere.

Foucault's genealogical method, which uncovers the historical and sociopolitical foundations of psychological constructs, serves as a critical lens to interrogate the seemingly objective nature of psychological categories. Conversely, Wittgenstein's grammatical approach delves into the language games and forms of life that shape our understanding of psychological concepts, emphasizing how these ideas are interwoven into our daily practices. The intersection of these methodologies offers a rich, dual-layered critique: genealogy exposes the contingent, power-laden processes that shape psychological science, while grammar elucidates the nuanced ways in which psychological language is used and understood.

This juxtaposition is not merely academic; it carries practical implications. When I mention adopting a Wittgensteinian perspective, I don't imply a dialectical back-and-forth between opposing views. Dialectics suggests a synthesis leading to a unified understanding, which is not my aim. Rather, I propose that the combination of genealogy and grammar should be viewed as a methodological complementarity, particularly beneficial within the philosophy of psychology. A complementary relationship implies that although the two methods do not align, both are essential for a comprehensive understanding of the subject.

Chapter 2: The Complementarity of Genealogy and Grammar

To illustrate this principle, consider Bohr's concept of complementarity. Inspired by Kierkegaard's recognition of irreducible tensions in human existence, Bohr's complementarity addresses contradictions inherent in quantum mechanics. This principle suggests that mutually exclusive perspectives—like wave and particle nature—each reveal critical truths about reality, even if they cannot be observed simultaneously. Rather than striving for a unified synthesis, Bohr acknowledged that a complete understanding of reality necessitates embracing conflicting descriptions as complementary. This insight mirrors the advocacy for a dual approach in the philosophy of psychology, where Wittgenstein's grammatical and Foucault's genealogical perspectives can be seen as mutually beneficial. Just as Bohr demonstrated that comprehending light required both classical and quantum perspectives, understanding psychological phenomena can similarly benefit from both genealogical scrutiny of historical power dynamics and grammatical analysis of language’s role in shaping thought.

Thus, my objective—one that requires demonstrative evidence rather than mere theoretical argument—is to show how a grammatical inquiry into psychology, as inspired and practiced by Wittgenstein, must be 'non-genealogical.' Likewise, I will need to illustrate how a genealogical critique of psychology, as executed by Foucault, must eschew grammatical considerations. In simpler terms, while grammatical analysis may prove useful, it often necessitates sidelining elements that do not conform to its structural framework.

Wittgenstein's phrase, "this is just what we do," is precisely where Foucault diverges. For Foucault, such acceptance prompts deeper inquiry: Is this genuinely our norm? Is there a motive behind it? Not a metaphysical essence, but perhaps a subtle power relation that drives the assertion, "this is just how we operate." Foucault reveals that within these ostensibly neutral or noble claims lies the potential for danger, masked by their virtuous appearance.

While Foucault effectively unveils hidden power dynamics, his genealogical approach may overlook the subtleties illuminated by Wittgenstein's grammatical analysis. Although genealogy highlights underlying power structures, it can sometimes neglect the everyday language that shapes psychological constructs. Foucault's emphasis on uncovering power and normalization may overshadow the ordinary, yet significant, ways language operates. Wittgenstein would urge us to examine how these statements function in everyday life, emphasizing that any power analysis should also account for the lived linguistic practices that can both reinforce and challenge power dynamics.

Both philosophers, influenced by their temperaments, sought to transcend their constraints—Foucault through power dynamics and Wittgenstein through everyday language. A framework that accommodates the complementarity of genealogy and grammar is Jürgen Link's concept of a three-layer discourse structure. Link, viewing through a Foucauldian lens, defines "special discourses" as high-level, specialized discussions in fields such as medicine and philosophy. Below this, 'interdiscourses' connect various special discourses, not through interdisciplinary means but via metaphorical connections that bridge knowledge across domains.

The interdiscursive level operates by integrating elements from diverse fields, allowing specialized knowledge to permeate everyday understanding. For instance, the metaphor of a "healthy economy" draws from medical discourse, yet is widely used in political and casual contexts to discuss complex fiscal policies. This interdiscursive exchange democratizes access to specialized knowledge while embedding power structures within everyday expressions, thereby sustaining the social order.

Ultimately, the elementary discourse, as described by Link, consists of non-discursive everyday interactions shaping our lives. This level encompasses what is 'typical,' the 'routine,' and structures of relevance, capturing the taken-for-granted aspects of life that often go unexamined. For example, the concepts of "normal" versus "abnormal" behavior illustrate how societal norms influence our perceptions of actions based on context. By focusing on these everyday practices, elementary discourse unveils how power relations and social norms are perpetuated at the most fundamental level.

When I first encountered Link's framework, I recognized its potential for merging genealogy and grammar. It seems both Wittgenstein and Foucault began their philosophical inquiries at the interdiscursive level, each influenced by their unique perspectives. This framework must not strictly adhere to genealogical principles if it is to effectively demonstrate the complementarity of both methods.

In summary, why does the combination of genealogy and grammar resonate so profoundly within the philosophy of psychology? The answer lies in the historical and linguistic influences shaping psychological phenomena. Genealogy critically examines how psychological constructs have been historically constructed through power dynamics, while grammar highlights how language shapes our understanding of these constructs in daily life. By integrating these methods, the philosophy of psychology can address both the historical contingencies and linguistic subtleties that inform our understanding of psychological experiences, leading to a more nuanced critique that neither method could achieve in isolation.